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Abstract 
 
Considerable attention has been directed in the recent finance and economics literature to issues concerning 
the effects on company failure risk of changes in the macroeconomic environment. This paper examines the 
accounting ratio-based and macroeconomic determinants of insolvency exit of UK large industrials during 
the early 1990s with a view to improve understanding of company failure risk. Failure determinants are 
revealed from estimates based on a cross-section of 369 quoted firms, which is followed by an assessment 
of predictive performance based on a series of time-to-failure-specific logit functions, as is typical in the 
literature. Within the traditional for cross-sectional data studies framework, a more complete model of 
failure risk is developed by adding to a set of traditional financial statement-based inputs, the two variables 
capturing aggregate economy risk - one-year lagged, unanticipated changes in the nominal interest rate and 
in the real exchange rate. Alternative estimates of prediction error are obtained, first, by analytically 
adjusting the apparent error rate for the downward bias and, second, by generating holdout predictions. 
More complete, augmented with the two macroeconomic variables models demonstrate improved out-of-
estimation-sample classificatory accuracy at risk horizons ranging from one to four years prior to failure, 
with the results being quite robust across a wide range of cut-off probability values, for both failing and 
non-failed firms.  
 
Although in terms of the individual ratio significance and overall predictive accuracy, the findings of the 
present study may not be directly comparable with the evidence from prior research due to differing data 
sets and model specifications, the results are intuitively appealing. First, the results affirm the important 
explanatory role of liquidity, gearing, and profitability in the company failure process. Second, the findings 
for the failure probability appear to demonstrate that shocks from unanticipated changes in interest and 
exchange rates may matter as much as the underlying changes in firm-specific characteristics of liquidity, 
gearing, and profitability. Obtained empirical determinants suggest that during the 1990s recession, shifts 
in the real exchange rate and rises in the nominal interest rate, were associated with a higher propensity of 
industrial company to exit via insolvency, thus indicating links to a loss in competitiveness and to the 
effects of high gearing. The results provide policy implications for reducing the company sector 
vulnerability to financial distress and failure while highlighting that changes in macroeconomic conditions 
should be an important ingredient of possible extensions of company failure prediction models.  
 
JEL Codes: G33 
 
Keywords: Company Failure, Aggregate Economy Risk, Unexpected Changes in Interest and Exchange 
Rates, Logit.  
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1 Introduction 
 
The central objective of the present paper is to investigate the impact of aggregate economy risk on 
company failure in a cross-section sample representative of 369 UK large quoted industrials in 1989-92. 
We proxy failure by the event of legal insolvency due to debt default, and consequently define failure risk 
as the potential that a company will enter a formal insolvency state. We refine the analysis of firm-level 
characteristics by controlling for variations in macroeconomic conditions. The key macroeconomic 
indicators, augmenting in this study a conventional, accounting ratio-based model of failure risk, were the 
nominal interest rate and the real effective exchange rate. Results from logit provide evidence that over the 
years before and during the 1990s recession, unanticipated shifts in the real effective exchange rate and in 
the nominal interest rate were associated with a higher propensity of industrial company to exit via 
insolvency. These effects seem to point to the adverse effect of inflation on highly geared firms, to a loss in 
competitiveness for the firms relying on exports and to a possible decline in performance via reported 
equity values for the firms with assets denominated in foreign currency. 
 
The determinants of failure risk are of natural interest to investors and lenders. At the macro level, the issue 
of corporate distress and failure has important implications of financial stability and economic growth. 
Given the potential severity of economic and social consequences of sharp rises in company failures, the 
knowledge of factors driving the corporate sector vulnerability to default and insolvency is important for 
informing forward-looking policies of banks and public bodies. The risk of failure through insolvency can 
be decomposed into three components: financial risk associated with highly geared capital structure, 
business risk, inherent in the firm’s operations, and aggregate economy risk. At the firm level, conventional 
quantitative analysis of failure risk involves a detailed examination of a firm’s balance sheet, income 
statement and cash flow, assuming that information on financial and business risks is reflected in financial 
accounts. However, an analysis of historical statements alone may present the incomplete picture of the 
relations underlying the failure process. Aggregate economy risk, arising from uncertainty regarding 
trading conditions due to business and credit cycles and other macroeconomic influences, affects the 
volatility of cash flows and thus clearly conditions the risk of corporate failure. In order to achieve a better 
approximation of complex interrelations between factors influencing the failure process, the business 
environment variables should be incorporated into a modelling framework. Recent academic research and 
commercial models of credit risk have attempted to take account of the role of macroeconomic conditions 
in explaining the process of corporate failure due to insolvency (see e.g. Moody’s Report № 53853, 2000; 
Bhattacharjee, Higson, Holly, Kattuman, 2002).  
 
The next section reviews the literature. Section 3 presents our examination of the role of macroeconomic 
instability in failure of UK quoted industrial firm in the early 1990s. Section 3.1 defines the proxy for 
failure and gives details of the data set structure. Section 3.2 describes factors driving failure risk in our 
model, while the modelling approach is discussed in Section 3.3. The estimation results are presented in 
Section 3.4 and Section 4 offers our conclusions.  
 
2 Company Failure Theories and Stylised Facts on the Role of Macroeconomic Factors  
 
There is of course a voluminous literature on company failure dating back to Beaver (1966). Much of it 
argues that, at the firm level, company failure is explained by economic inefficiency, debt financing and 
management mistakes. Neo-classical economics equates failure to the firm’s exit from the market (Mueller, 
1991). From this angle, failure is a manifestation of Schumpeterian ‘creative destruction’ through which the 
market selects between efficient and inefficient firms. According to neo-classical analysis, insufficient 
profitability is the main factor that in the long run forces the firm to reduce its presence in the market and 
exit the industry. Firms that do not supply the product at the competitive price-cost margins face financial 
difficulties generated by the inevitable discipline of factor and product markets and exit. Obviously, failure 
in the economic sense need not be accompanied immediately by financial distress arising from liquidity 
shortages and external financing constraints. Within this framework, the possible exit rout of formal 
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insolvency proceedings can be viewed as a welfare-enhancing device and way of re-allocating industry-
specific resources.1  
 
In business language, the word ‘failure’ generally means that a company has become involved in certain 
legal consequences. The company unable to meet or renegotiate the cash claims upon it exercises its right 
to default, which usually follows by the firm’s creditors instituting legal proceedings whereby all claims 
against the company are settled. The risk of business failure is associated with debt financing and the lack 
of liquidity, but ultimately depends on the limits of lenders’ willingness to support the firm. As argued by 
Armour and Frisby (2001), a rational secured creditor will cease supporting the firm where the returns from 
enforcement are greater than the returns from negotiations. However, these returns are not directly 
observable. 
 
In economic terms a firm may exit the market due to a lack of profitable opportunities and this may not 
be accompanied by financial distress (Lambrecht, 2001). Although financial distress does not accurately 
represents economic failure, it may be caused by economic distress at firm and industry levels. Economic 
inefficiency is usually not directly observable, while financial distress may straightforwardly be inferred 
from such outcomes as debt defaults and legal insolvency cases. For ease of tractability debt default and 
legal insolvency are often used to proxy the state of failure in empirical work. The financial economics 
emphasises that indebtedness is the main determinant of failure because financial distress is induced by 
debt and because default is an attribute of a credit asset. However, as the finance literature argues, debt 
performs an important function of contingent control allocations (Aghion and Bolton, 1992), enabling 
involved in complex financial contracts creditors to take over control of the firm once default occurs and 
resolve distress. Viewed in this light, debt is an invaluable controlling device while default and bankruptcy 
serve as a particular kind of catalyst for restructuring of claims. Consequently financial distress may not 
necessarily entail exit from the industry and a welfare loss.  
 
The management strand of theories (e.g. Argenti, 1976; Hambrick and D’Aveni, 1988; The Society of 
Practitioners of Insolvency Fifth Survey, 1996) suggests the primary role of management error and poor 
corporate governance in company failure. If failure is due to bad governance, default may create value by 
forcing the management to reduce production capacity and rethink operating policy and strategy decisions. 
Financial distress will also generate value when the firm value is the highest in liquidation and the 
management is reluctant to liquidate. Thus the insolvency mechanism may help financially distressed but 
economically viable companies stay in business and facilitate exit of inefficient firms.  
 
Notwithstanding the possibility of potential benefits of distress and bankruptcy, which are yet to be 
quantified empirically, these processes involve substantial direct costs (legal, administrative and advisory 
fees) and indirect (opportunity) costs of real resources to the firm and to its stakeholders (see e.g. Wruck, 
1990). In a highly geared firm faced with credit constraints, a small decline in performance due to a change 
in the macro-environment, may adversely affect its liquidity position and capacity to meet interest 
payments, triggering debt default. Even when the firm is economically viable in the long run, it may not, 
due to borrowing constraints, escape going bust in the short run. This will generate an additional welfare 
loss when the firm’s assets are more productive within the firm than when transferred to another owner. At 
the economy level, inefficiently high rates of failures in a fragile corporate sector can have serious welfare 
and macroeconomic consequences. Financial distress can lead to inefficient excessive piecemeal 
liquidations, especially when an industry is hit by the industry-wide or economy-wide shocks. In the 
situation when losses on corporate loan book are unanticipated, high liquidation rates can, by gradually 
eroding bank capital, weaken the banking system and trigger a financial crisis. Furthermore, as Vlieghe 
(2001) points out, a heightened state of financial fragility at a single firm leads to inefficient allocation of 
resources because a reduction in available credit causes valuable investment opportunities to be missed 
while resources devoted to renegotiating debt contracts are crowding out resources required for production.  
 
                                                          
1 It should be noted, however, that a firm might disappear from the industry as a result of merger. Rivals possibly may 
acquire the successful firm’s assets and expertise and apply it to the products of both firms. In this case exit comes from 
success. 
 4
Numerous empirical studies have examined the determinants of corporate failure risk with firm-level 
information available from historical financial statements. Such analyses are intended to aid understanding 
the risk of bankruptcy and to facilitate its monitoring of at the firm level as well as to provide appropriate, 
failure incidence reducing policy responses at the economy level. This said, it should also be noted that the 
current empirical literature on the determinants of company failure lacks a unifying structural model2. 
Stylised models of company failure, constructed for UK firms have involved multiple discriminant 
analysis, logit and neural networks as statistical settings for the problem of identifying risk factors. Taffler 
and Tisshaw (1977), Marais (1979), Taffler (1982), Peel, Peel, and Pope (1986), Goudie (1987), Keasey 
and McGuinness (1990), Goudie and Meeks (1991), Cosh and Hughes (1995), Alici (1995), and Morris 
(1997) have modelled failure with cross-sectional data using accounting ratios-based explanatory variables. 
The competing risks framework has recently been employed for an exploration of the joint influence of 
firm-specific and macroeconomic factors on bankruptcy risk in Bhattacharjee, Higson, Holly and Kattuman 
(2002). In relation to the importance of firm-level attributes, observable from financial accounts, these 
studies have summarily documented that high gearing, declining profitability and insufficient liquidity 
increase the likelihood of distress and insolvency.  
 
However, the failure process is not completely determined by firm’s characteristics alone, being in part 
related to environmental factors. Failure risk of a geared firm is amplified by macroeconomic instability 
and therefore the question of failure determinants should be seen in a macroeconomic context. Relevant to 
our objective of an integrated analysis of impacts of firm-level and aggregate economy factors, are 
empirical studies on the aggregate liquidation rate based on the experience of UK firms. These studies have 
produced several stylised facts regarding the strong impact on failure risk of the business cycle, inflation, 
and movements in interest and exchange rates.  
 
Increases in inflation and in the nominal interest rate heighten aggregate rates of failure (Wadhwani, 1986; 
Davis, 1995; Robson, 1996) consistent with the notion that in the absence of indexed economy and perfect 
capital markets, firms financed with variable-rate debt may be unable to increase their borrowing and 
therefore inevitably face cash shortages. Wadhwani (1986) explored the determinants of UK corporate 
failure with quarterly data on total liquidations and found that declining profitability and the nominal 
interest rate determined aggregate insolvency rates. Having experimented with both real and nominal 
interest rates, Wadhwani interpreted the fact that the nominal interest rate was a highly significant 
determinant as evidence that inflation had driven corporate liquidations in the study period. When debt is 
not indexed and capital markets are imperfect, price inflation raises nominal interest charges. Due to 
historical cost accounting, inflation tends to distort the company’s valuation worsening its financial 
position and limiting its ability to raise external funds. Inflation badly affects cash flows for capital 
allowances fixed in nominal terms as a proportion of historic costs implying that taxes tend to rise in real 
terms due to inflation. By affecting negatively interest cover, inflation reduces the firm’s chances in 
obtaining new loan finance. Aside from that, inflation can also engender expectations of a subsequent 
tightening of macroeconomic policy, leading to a decline in business confidence. Recent empirical findings 
on the exit behaviour of listed UK firms over 1965-98 presented by Bhattacharjee, Higson, Holly and 
Kattuman (2002), have corroborated Wadhwani’s results that uncertainty in the form of sharp increases of 
inflation heightened bankruptcy risk.  
 
Analyses of the impact of interest rates on aggregate rates of company failure have also been undertaken in 
Hudson (1986), who focused on rates of compulsory liquidations and creditors’ voluntary liquidations, and 
in Simmons (1989) for bankruptcies of small, unincorporated businesses. Results from these studies, 
however, documented the inverse relation between the real interest rate and the liquidation rate, in contrast 
to the findings of Wadhwani. The inverse relation can be interpreted as evidence for adverse selection in 
credit markets. At high real rates, credit is likely to be diverted to high-risk borrowers, i.e. distressed firms, 
which are consequently less likely to fail. Vlieghe (2001) observed the long-run impact of the real interest 
                                                          
2 In academic research, much empirical modelling of company failure determinants at the firm-level has been based on 
cross-section data and therefore made no attempt of applying analytical approaches typical of analyses of the timing of 
default problem in the line of Merton (1974). The event of default as such is deduced from the evolution of the firm’s 
market value, for instance, in commercial models of failure risk presented in Crosbie (1998), where of course the 
analysis question is rather different, related to measuring the probability and time of default.  
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rate on corporate sector fragility in a recent investigation of the UK over the period 1975-99. Vlieghe also 
found the short-run effect of the nominal interest rate, suggesting the adverse impact of high inflation upon 
company cash flows in imperfect capital markets. A modification of Wadhwani’s model was tested for the 
UK corporate sector during 1969-90 in Davis (1995), who found that rising inflation, the business cycle 
(recession), and factor prices were as important for explaining business failure rates as gearing.  
 
Bankruptcy risk is procyclical (Turner, Coutts and Bowden, 1992; Davis, 1995). As sales and earnings of 
companies are directly related to the overall business activity, most defaults occur during or immediately 
after recessions, which are often coincident with periods of monetary and fiscal constraints. The link from 
recession to bankruptcy is an increased incidence of technical insolvency – inability to meet current cash 
obligations. This effect is influential in imperfect capital markets, which prevent companies from being 
able to borrow as much as they would to cover cash flow shortages resulting from a fall in demand. 
However, an empirical study of company exit by Bhattacharjee, Higson, Holly, Kattuman (2002), relying 
on a large panel data set, reported that the business cycle did not emerged as a key factor explaining 
bankruptcy risk over the period 1965-1998. 
 
Unexpected changes in inflation and interest rates, rather than their levels, are critical as to bankruptcy risk 
(Young, 1995; Robson, 1996). Since observed values of the interest rate may be to some extent anticipated, 
then only the unanticipated component represents a ‘surprise’ impacting adversely on company survival. 
Evidence on the extent to which ex post inflation and real interest rates differ from their expected levels and 
its relevance to the rate of compulsory and creditors’ voluntary liquidations has been provided by Young 
(1995). Macroeconomic instability, associated with high inflation and rapid, unanticipated movements in 
the real interest rate and demand, led to a higher liquidation rate of UK companies in 1977-92. Young 
argued that the firm’s response to changes in interest rates depended on the composition of its debt 
contract.3 Companies financed by variable-rate debt would be adversely affected by unexpected increases 
in real interest rates as that reduces the market value of their capital, but does not affect the value of 
variable-rate debt, causing the firm’s net worth to fall. Firms financed at fixed nominal interest rates would 
be vulnerable to unanticipated reductions in inflation. Young’s results show that a rise in nominal interest 
rates may either increase, decrease or have no effect on the rate of liquidations, depending on whether it 
corresponds to a rise in real interest rates or inflation, is anticipated or unanticipated, and debt is at fixed 
rates or variable rates. Rises in long-term interest rates by increasing the cost of capital may increase failure 
risk by forcing firms to shift their preferences towards riskier investment projects associated with higher 
rates of expected return required to afford debt finance. Robson’s (1996) examination of the influence of 
macroeconomic factors on the extent of UK businesses’ dissolutions for 1980-90, confirmed the findings 
reported in Wadhwani and Young, but also emphasized the explanatory power of the real interest rate.  
 
As mentioned earlier, creditors’ willingness to support the distressed firm is an additional factor for 
explaining insolvency risk, but information of the relevant motives is hard to come by. Turner, Coutts, and 
Bowden (1992) highlighted, the prevalence of short-term cash flow considerations in deciding distressed 
companies’ fate in their time series study of liquidations over the period 1951-89. The macroeconomic 
component in their model was represented by the nominal interest rate, the rate of price inflation, the rate of 
growth of money stock capturing credit market constraints, and the rate of company formation reflecting 
the age structure of companies. The nominal rather than real rate of interest explained failure probabilities 
in their data. They concluded that credit markets did not allow firms to adjust their debt levels for inflation, 
with the overall implication that the short-term, cash flow considerations were dominating creditors’ 
decisions regarding the fate of distressed companies. Similar points emerged from the work of Cuthbertson 
and Hudson (1996), where compulsory liquidations amongst UK companies over the period 1972-89 were 
analysed. In their paper income gearing was used as a joint proxy for the nominal interest rate and capital 
gearing. The observation that income gearing specified in differences was significant has been interpreted 
                                                          
3 A company that has borrowed at a floating rate of interest may find that interest rate rises will place real strains on 
cash flows and profitability. Conversely, a company that has a fixed rate of interest will find that when interest rates are 
falling it will not enjoy benefits of lower interest charges. To reduce or eliminate the expected component of the 
interest rate risk, a company may enter into a hedging arrangement, such as forward rate agreements, interest rate 
options and swaps. However, unanticipated movements in interest rates can present a significant issue for companies 
that have high levels of borrowing. 
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as evidence that gearing is a short-run factor, implying creditors’ myopia as to the firm future prospects. 
The result seemed also indicative of the firm’s ability to adapt, after time, to high nominal interest rates by 
reducing borrowing and, in the long run, by cutting input costs. 
 
The role of movements in the exchange rate on failure risk of UK companies has been studied in Goudie 
and Meeks (1991), in Vlieghe (2001) and in Bhattacharjee, Higson, Holly and Kattuman (2002). The 
exchange rate had an additional explanatory power in Goudie and Meeks’s model. Their analysis linked 
failure risk to the degree of transaction exposure suggesting that failure can be a penalty for producing 
exports at a time of a soaring exchange rate, especially if the rise is combined with relative price increases 
leading to a disastrous loss of competitiveness. Notably, previous studies have observed very different 
effects of the exchange rate on bankruptcy risk. For instance, Bhattacharjee, Higson, Holly, Kattuman 
(2002) found the adverse impact of a sharp depreciation of the pound-dollar exchange rate on UK quoted 
firms for 1965-98, noting that this result can reflect the possibility that a fall in the exchange rate 
disadvantaged domestic business. Freshly listed companies in their sample were more likely to go bankrupt 
in years, characterized by unfavourable movements in the exchange rates. In contrast, a recent model of 
liquidation rates, based on variables reflecting the corporate sector financial position and macroeconomic 
conditions, which was presented in Vlieghe (2001) did not appear to confirm the explanatory role of a 
trade-weighted real exchange index4.  
 
The conclusions of studies into aggregate rates of bankruptcy underscore the importance for the corporate 
sector of a smooth and predictable macroeconomic environment. In addition, these stylised facts seem to 
bring to the fore the management role in the failure process as they seem to agree with managerial theories 
of corporate failure highlighting possible inadequacies in risk management in UK companies. Thus it is 
important to account for these factors in a model of failure risk.  
 
3 Examination of a Sample of UK Quoted Firms in 1989-92 
 
In this study, we have augmented a financial ratio-based model of failure risk with two macroeconomic 
variables so as to explore the explanatory power of macroeconomic factors and to get a better 
understanding of the failure process. We use firm-level data on UK large quoted companies, representative 
of insolvency over the 1990-92 recession. The determinants of failure are evaluated from the estimated 
results of two sets of logit functions and their associated predictive performance. The prediction functions 
of the first set rely on traditional, financial ratio-based inputs alone. The second set of models uses both 
financial ratio-based predictors and two macroeconomic variables, measuring unanticipated changes in the 
real effective exchange rate and in the nominal interest rate. A single set of models is a series of individual 
logit functions estimated with data specific to four risk horizons, ranging from one year to four years prior 
to failure. Multiple observations on financial variables permit to evaluate the extent to which determinants 
of failure tend to change over time while the pooled cross-sectional structure allows an incorporation of 
time-series observations on the two macroeconomic indicators.  
 
3.1 Failure Definition and Data Composition 
 
By adopting a purely legalistic criterion, we equate company failure with the event of entering a formal 
insolvency regime, that is administrative receivership, administration, or winding-up (liquidation). Using 
information on quoted company insolvency status from the London Stock Exchange Official Yearbook and 
financial statement data from DATASTREAM, we compile a list of firms5 going into insolvency over the 
early 1990s and then create estimation and holdout cross-sections. Since availability of data on insolvent 
firms is always a limiting factor in developing statistical models of corporate failure, data points 
comprising a single, year-to-failure-specific cross-section come from several consecutive calendar years. 
An advantage of the pooled cross-section design is that it provides a temporal dimension to the data, which 
is of great importance for isolating the influence of macroeconomic factors on failure risk. Annualised 
                                                          
4 Vlieghe (2001) uses a rich specification which contains explanatory variables measuring company indebtedness, 
profitability, availability of external and internal finance, property prices, corporate bond spreads, factor prices, 
nominal and real interest rates, the company formation rate, and the real effective exchange rate. 
5 See Table A-1in the Appendix. 
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financial records were collected for a four-year period prior to insolvency so as to reveal the determinants 
of failure occurring in one, two, three and four years, allowing for temporal precedence. Therefore the 
sample companies are subject to at least four consecutive years of complete accounting records. The sub-
set of 53 failing firms defines the estimation period, which in terms of calendar year of insolvency 
announcement covers 1989-93, corresponding to the period of high default rates in the early 1990s. 
Records concerning firms’ financial conditions concentrate in 1988-91 because of the lag between last 
accounts and insolvency announcement. Although we use non-random sampling for the failed firm 
category, 368 company-years based on 316 non-failing firms were drawn randomly, without replacement, 
from data on industrial firms with complete and consistent DATASTREAM records over the period 1985-
956. Non-failed firms in our sample had been continuing in independent existence and were free of 
insolvency up to 1995. No matching of failed and non-failed companies by criteria such as industry sector 
or size was used, but to counter-effect modification associated with time, we matched the observations on 
failing and non-failed firms by the timing of financial records. The sampling scheme has yielded 
unbalanced cross-sections with the failing firm category accounting for 12.6 per cent of company-years, 
which seem representative of the quoted company population proportions for failed and non-failed 
categories.7 A sample with the prevailing proportion of non-failed firms permits a relatively large number 
of observations and provides a sounder basis for evaluating models’ performance. In this way, we can 
better approximate the population’s insolvency rate to deal with the well known methodological problem of 
biased estimates where state-based samples are employed in conjunction with estimators and inference 
procedures that assume random sampling (see e.g. Palepu, 1986).  
 
To perform an ‘out-of-sample’ validation of the obtained determinants, we create year-to-failure specific 
holdout samples containing observations on firms entering the insolvency state in 1992-95, and in 2001-04. 
These were compiled according to the filters and procedures employed in designing the primary estimation 
sample8. In terms of timing of financial records, the observations that make up the first holdout sample are 
distributed over the period 1992-94. Data points in the second holdout sample cover different companies 
and are taken from accounts for 1997-2005. The first holdout sample is unbalanced, with a 10.4 per cent 
share of failing firms, while the second holdout is an equal-share sample.  
 
The composition of sample firms by insolvency status and sector are provided in Table A-3 of the 
Appendix. Companies in transportation and petroleum industries were not included as their capital structure 
tend to be quite unique and these industries have different taxation regimes, accounting conventions, and 
the insolvency environment.  
 
3.2 Explanatory Variables 
 
Financial Variables 
 
Information from audited annual accounts is seen in the literature as a critical input to empirical models of 
company failure, however there exists no dominant or unique set of accounting variables with respect to 
corporate performance and financial position. Empirical results from Hamer (1983) on comparative power 
                                                          
6 A primary listing of non-failed firms was tabulated from the DATASTREAM list of UK “ live” quoted industrials 
that consisted of 1,330 equities as of 13 February 1997. 
7 It is impossible to access how accurately the sample mix approximates the proportions of failed and non-failed firms 
in the underlying population of large quoted industrials, as the necessary data have been hard to acquire. To our 
knowledge, comprehensive time series on the number of UK quoted companies suffering financial distress or being 
placed into formal insolvency regimes have not been reported systematically, and only rough and even arbitrary 
estimates have been used in previous research. Estimates of population proportions for failed and continuing firms 
vary. Letza (1994) refers to Dun and Bradstreet’s estimate of the long run average failure rate of companies in England 
and Wales at 0.85 per cent. Taffler (1982) drew on subjective estimates of the investment analysts and used an odds 
ratio (based on the prior probabilities for a failed and non-failed firm) of 1:10. Focusing on the period of 1968-73, his 
study was concerned with industrial enterprises quoted on the London Stock Exchange, and failure was defined as 
formal insolvency. Dunne and Hughes (1994) examined death rates over the period of 1980-85 in the sample of 2,149 
UK firms that included all quoted and large unquoted companies, and found that, on average, liquidations or 
receiverships accounted for 3.7 per cent of sample firms.  
8 See Table A-2 in the Appendix. 
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of failure prediction models show no significant variation in models’ performance that can be attributed to 
alternative definitions of ratios or combinations of ratio-based variables as long as a set of accounting ratios 
is comprehensive and represents major dimensions of financial analysis. Hamer recommends considering a 
single set of accounting covariates that minimises the cost of data collection. Therefore we employ a fairly 
standard range of 25 accounting ratios and market measures based on items provided for quoted industrial 
companies by DATASTREAM.9 These include: rates of return, profit margins, cumulative profitability, 
turnover ratios, measures of gearing, liquidity and tax position, total net sales proxying firm’s size, the net 
tangible assets index, which reflects long-term solvency, and the dividend payout ratio. To alleviate the 
problem of non-stationarity of financial ratios arising in a pooled cross-section data (see e.g. Sudarsanam 
and Taffler, 1995), values of ratio-based covariates have been standardised using mean and standard 
deviations from their respective accounting years. Tables A-4 and A-5 in the Appendix show some 
descriptive statistics of financial ratio-based explanatory variables for each of the four years prior to failure. 
Macroeconomic Variables 
In modelling the influence of macroeconomic factors we follow the approach used by Young (1995) for 
representing uncertainty in the macroeconomic environment, in that it is assumed that only unanticipated 
changes - ‘surprises’ - in the interest rate and in the exchange rate matter for company viability. Anticipated 
changes in interest and exchange rates, damaging firms’ cash flows and equity values, should be possible to 
incorporate in strategies for hedging and other business decisions. As pointed out by Wadhwani (1986), the 
nominal interest rate seems to be an especially relevant explanatory factor in the failure process. The 
empirical results in Goudie and Meeks (1991) and Bhattacharjee, Higson, Holly, Kattuman (2002) suggest 
the importance of shifts in the exchange rate on company performance and survival. A real appreciation in 
the effective exchange rate increases failure risk by adversely affecting profitability and competitiveness of 
both the exporters, sensitive to external competition, and those firms that compete internally and are 
therefore sensitive to the level of import penetration. A real depreciation in the effective exchange rate can 
also adversely affect firms with foreign currency debt. Hunter and Simpson (1995) discuss in greater detail 
the impact of the conservative government policy on the exchange rate and competitiveness of UK 
companies over the early 1990s.  
Further, we assume a delay in the effect of changes in the two macroeconomic indicators on firm 
performance and financial position. Due to the certain extent of inertia, it is the last year’s mistakes and 
miss-predictions, which may be critical as a financial distress trigger. The failure process might well be 
driven by a sequence of such mistakes. Accordingly, in modelling, we utilize lagged unanticipated changes 
in the annualised values of macroeconomic variables corresponding with the timings of financial records on 
the sample firms. 
 
As unanticipated changes in macroeconomic variables are not directly observable, they must be proxied. 
The simplest path to follow is to make a major assumption that the macroeconomic series of interest evolve 
as a random walk.10 To measure the underlying economic risks affecting the likelihood of failure, we then 
assume that the process for a series of observations of the macroeconomic variable tu  is generated by a 
naive (driftless) random walk: 
                                                          
9 The financial ratios in the more general specifications were: the logarithm of Total Sales (Net of Trade 
Discounts), Return on Shareholders’ Capital, Return on Capital Employed, Return on Net Fixed Assets, 
Cumulative Profitability, Operating Profit Margin, Pre-tax Profit Margin, Net Profit Margin, Turnover / 
Fixed Assets, Turnover / Net Current Assets, Stock Turnover, Debtors Turnover, Creditors Turnover, 
Capital Gearing, Income Gearing, Borrowing Ratio, Gross Cash-flow / Total Liabilities, Working Capital 
Ratio, Quick Assets Ratio, Net Current Assets / Total Assets Employed, Market Value/Book Value, Payout 
Ratio, Asset Index (based on the book value of tangible shareholders’ funds or net tangible assets in the 
balance sheet) and Tax Ratio. 
10 As for the nominal interest rate process this assumption is a gross simplification. However, stylised facts concerning 
time series for the major exchange rates (under floating exchange rate regimes) are that exchange rates are hard to 
distinguish empirically from a simple random walk (Mussa, 1984; Taylor, 1995). Meese and Rogoff (1988) report that 
their regression forecasts of log real exchange rates are never significantly better than the driftless random walk.  
Evidence on real exchange rates stationarity has been presented by Hunter and Simpson  (2001).  
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     );IID(0,~   2 ntuu tttt ,...,1;1 =+= − σεε ,    (1) 
 
Where tu  is a value of the macroeconomic variable at time t; and tε  is a random disturbance, not 
predictable from the history of the process. 
 
Then the conditional mean and variance of the variable at date t, conditional on the initial value 0u  at date 
0, is: 
0)|( 00 += uuuE t        (2) 
2
0 )|( σ=uuVar t .      (3) 
That implies that the unanticipated change in the macroeconomic variable equals ))(( tt uEu − , that is the 
entire change is unanticipated. It is obvious from (1) - (3), that one can approximate the ‘surprise’ by the 
one-year lagged change in the macroeconomic variable. 
 
Accordingly, we construct the one-year lagged logarithmic change in the real effective exchange rate, 
which influences competitiveness in the traded goods sector, and the one-year lagged logarithmic change in 
the nominal interest rate, which directly impacts on the burden of debt and capacity to raise finance. If 
financial statement-based independent variables describing an individual firm in the pooled cross-section 
pertain to year t, then the two macroeconomic variables are measured as follows: 
 
]2ln1[ln Rate Exchange Effective Real in the Change Laggedyear -One )RER(t)-RER(t −−= , (4) 
 
where the real effective exchange rate, )(tRER , is given as an index,11  
 
]2ln1[ln RateInterest  Nominal in the Change Laggedyear -One )(tIR)-(tIR nn −−= , (5) 
 
where the nominal interest rate, nIR , is given by the 3-month sterling inter-bank rate measured as the 
annualised percentage rate.12 
 
An additional advantage of specifying macroeconomic measures in differences is that the resulting 
macroeconomic covariates are stationary, complementing the correction made for financial statement-based 
variables. As noted earlier, the potential for the joint use of cross-sectional financial data and 
macroeconomic time-series is provided here by the structure of repeated pooled cross-sections allowing the 
variation of financial covariates over time. 
 
It is important to observe that the expected value of the two macroeconomic variables is zero, implying on 
average zero response to either the interest rate change or the exchange rate change. One can argue that 
unanticipated rises both in the exchange rate and in the interest rate had the adverse impact on those 
companies that would consequently fail, thus to capture the influence of changes in the business climate, a 
macroeconomic dummy variable is constructed that is equal to ‘one’ for failed companies. This dummy is 
then used in interactions with each macroeconomic variable. It follows that the predictions from the model 
will be conditional on the mistakes in macroeconomic forecasts, the effect of which is measured from their 
impact on failed firms. Hence, we are looking at the risk of failure conditional on a poor response to 
changes in macroeconomic conditions13.  
                                                          
11 The index is the DATASTREAM item “UKOCREXC”. This measure is similar to a trade-weighted exchange rate 
index employed in Vlieghe (2001).  
12 Young (1995) employed this proxy for the nominal interest rate. 
13 We should also comment on a potential methodological problem of measuring the impact of aggregate macro 
variables on micro units, when a strategy of merging aggregate data with cross-sectional data is employed (Moulton, 
1990). Using an example of the linear model, Moulton cautions that ignoring the correlation of errors within groups, 
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3.3 Statistical Model 
In the case of conventional, failed/non-failed dichotomy, the dependent variable is a binary response. An 
outcome is a reflection of the underlying regression, which links the dependent variable y  to the 
explanatory and control variables gathered in the vector x . 
If the logistic density is used to specify the link for the unknown probability that the binary outcome is 
equal to ‘one’ than the probability for a company to fail is given by the following expression: 
 
i
i
e
eFailureY xβ
xβ
′
′
+== 1))( 1(Prob .     (6) 
 
Here yi independently equals 1 or 0 with probabilities ii ππ -1or    . The iπˆ  is considered as predicting 
whether an observation with the covariate vector ix  will be a failed firm or a non-failed firm, by using the 
realised prediction rule ηˆ : 


≤=
>
,ˆ if   0ˆ
,ˆ if   1=ˆ
0
0
C
C
ii
ii
πη
πη
     (7) 
for some cut-off point 0C . 
 
The primary test of a constructed model adequacy and its ability to reveal the determinants of failure is 
whether the model accurately returns response values for future observations, taken outside the estimation 
sample range and time period.  
The classificatory power of the model, fitted to the estimation sample, is commonly defined as the apparent 
error rate, yielding an estimate of the true error rate of the model (Efron, 1986): 
ni /}ˆ{y #rre i
_ η≠= .     (8) 
 
Because y is used for both constructing and assessing the prediction rule ηˆ , rre  will usually be biased 
downwards and as a result the new binary outcome might not be predicted nearly as accurately by the old 
ηˆ .  
 
The bias (or the optimism) is the difference between the true error rate and the apparent error rate. Hence, 
the purpose of estimating the bias is to a superior estimate of the true error rate than that calculated by the 
apparent error rate. In assessing the ex ante predictive power of the realised prediction rule based on logit, 
we generate holdout predictions and compute analytic estimates of the optimism in the apparent error rate, 
using the method proposed by Efron (1986). Efron’s solution allows adjusting the overall apparent error 
rate generated on estimation samples for the optimism. The analytic estimate of the expected downward 
bias in the apparent error rate is added to the apparent error rate so as to obtain an improved estimate of 
prediction error (see appendix), and to infer how well a model predicts the response value of a future 
observation. A model with better explanatory power will generate lower error rates. It should be noted that 
it would be inappropriate to compare classificatory accuracy rates for alternative models derived from and 
assessed on different data sets.  
                                                                                                                                                                             
which used to merge aggregate with micro data, can result in spurious downward bias of the usual OLS standard errors, 
the resulting inflation of test statistics and incorrect inference. It is important to emphasize that in our empirical design 
no aggregate measure is being used as we combine with financial statement data on firms such economic indicators as 
the nominal interest rate and the real exchange rate. Moreover, the cost of omitting relevant explanatory variables is 
inconsistency. Nonetheless, we recognise that in further research it might be desirable to investigate further the 
implications and solutions of this potential problem when a range of macroeconomic variables used in logit models of 
failure is expanded by the addition of aggregate macro variables. 
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3.4 Results 
We interpret the estimated models as describing the conditional expectation of the failure outcome given 
the selected explanatory variables. The model building approach utilised here is the standard general-to-
specific modelling method14. To produce a parsimonious model an initial general specification is tested 
down by eliminating covariates using a sequence of t-tests and independent Likelihood Ratio tests. The 
resulting model should essentially contain a satisfactory proportion of information conveyed by the original 
general specification, while also being much more parsimonious.  
We present two groups of logit estimates: from models explaining failure with financial covariates alone 
(Tables 1 and 2) and from models incorporating macroeconomic effects (Tables 3 and 4). Estimates are 
shown separately for the four specified risk horizons, covering one to four years before failure. Tables A-5, 
A-6, A-7, and A-8 in the Appendix, present the goodness of fit, which is judged by the within-the-
estimation-sample classificatory accuracy adjusted for the optimism, and by the models’ power to predict 
fresh, holdout observations.  The choice of the relevant cut-off probability value, which influences 
classification results, has been discussed elsewhere (see e.g. Ohlson, 1980; Palepu, 1986; Maddala, 1992; 
Greene, 1997; Bayldon and Zafiris, 1999; Cramer, 1999).  As pointed out in Cramer (1999), in assessing 
the within-sample performance of a model derived from the unbalanced sample, the cut-off probability 
taken from sample frequencies is the appropriate one to use. However, here we follow Ohlson (1980), and 
evaluate classificatory and predictive accuracy for a wide range of cut-off probability values ranging 0.1 to 
0.875.  
 
Basic Models Based on Financial Variables   
 
The overall significance of the four parsimonious models based on financial variables alone (Tables 1 and 
2) is acceptable as the 2χ  statistics for the joint significance of model parameters exceed respective 
critical values at the 0.1% level. The model for the one-year risk horizon shows the best fit in terms of the 
Likelihood Ratio Index15 (Table 1). The results for one year prior to failure reflect the information 
contained in the last accounts released by a failing company, and therefore record the state of severe 
distress. The estimates indicate that the company with low creditors turnover, high gearing, low liquidity, 
and a smaller proportion of earnings paid out as dividends, is more likely to fail. The predicted signs for 
profitability ratios indicate that, in the short run, the failing firm has negative operating profits, which might 
be interpreted as a sign of economic distress. Failing firms have lower returns on capital employed relative 
to non-failed firms, but may record higher returns on shareholders’ capital. The counterintuitive positive 
relation of the return on shareholders’ capital to failure risk can simply be due to the DATASTREAM 
specification of the ratio used, with the combination of negative numbers for after-tax profits and negative 
values for shareholders’ funds yielding the positive sign for the ratio.  
 
Using longer time horizons, failure determinants are revealed from models estimated using covariates two, 
three, and four years prior to failure. Reinforcing the stylised fact that smaller firms exit first (see e.g. 
Dunne, Roberts, Samuelson, 1989), size appears indicative of insolvency in years two through to four prior 
to failure. The model predicting failure in two-year time (Table 1) suggests that failing firms generate lower 
cash flows, have inadequate current assets and reduce dividends as compared with non-failing firms. The 
results for the three-year risk horizon (Table 2) imply that, in the long run, high gearing, measured by 
capital and income gearing, distinguishes the likely to fail firms from survivors. A positive relationship is 
also observed between current assets turnover and the probability of failure, which may be consistent with 
the view that highly geared and fast growing companies fared least well during the 1990-92 recession. The 
model specific to the four-year risk horizon (Table 2) seems to confirm chronic liquidity shortages of 
failing companies. When compared with the healthy company’s profile, failing firms appear to have 
                                                          
14 See Hendry, Muellbauer and Murphy, 1990. 
15 See McFadden, 1974. 
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comparatively less long-term debt, but borrow heavily from short-term sources to compensate for 
insufficient current assets and for low levels of their gross cash flow relative to total liabilities. This is 
implied in the positively signed borrowing ratio and in the negatively signed ratio of loan capital to equity 
and reserves. The failing companies’ reliance on borrowings with less that one year maturity, is also  
 
 Table 1:   Financial Ratio-Based Models: 
  One and Two Years Prior to Failure; 1988-91 Estimation Period,  
  53 Failed Companies and 368 Non-failed Company-years (n=421) 
  
 
 
  One Year Prior to 
Failure 
Two Years Prior to 
Failure 
Dimension 
Variable 
Coefficient 
(two-tailed p-value of 
asymptotic t-statistic) 
Coefficient 
(two-tailed p-value of 
asymptotic t-statistic) 
Constant -3.249 (0.000) -2.517 (0.000) 
Size     
Log Total Sales    -0.455 (0.022) 
Profitability     
Return on Shareholders’ Capital 1.370 (0.006)   
Return on Capital employed  -1.244 (0.001)   
Operating Profit  Margin  -0.813 (0.017)   
Pre-tax Profit Margin      
Turnover      
Turnover/Net Current Assets      
Creditors Turnover  -0.450 (0.048)   
Gearing      
Capital Gearing  0.667 (0.001)   
Income Gearing      
Borrowing Ratio      
Gross Cash Flow/ Total Liabilities   -0.705 (0.000) 
Loan Capital/Equity and Reserves      
Liquidity     
Working Capital Ratio  -1.789 (0.000) -1.124 (0.000) 
Working Capital / Assets Employed     
Other Financial Variables     
Payout Ratio -1.312 (0.020) -0.800 (0.056) 
Assets Index      
Tax Ratio      
Log-Likelihood at Convergence -103.55 -125.85 
χ2 statistic of LR Test (p-value) 111.61 (0.000) 67.00 (0.000) 
Likelihood Ratio Index 0.325 0.179 
n 421 
Per cent Failed 12.6 
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Table 2:  Financial Ratio-Based Models: 
  Three and Four Years Prior to Failure; 1988-91 Estimation Period, 
  53 Failed Companies and 368 Non-failed Company-years (n=421) 
  
 
 
  Three Years Prior to 
Failure 
Four Years Prior to 
Failure 
Dimension 
Variable 
Coefficient 
(two-tailed p-value of 
asymptotic t-statistic) 
Coefficient 
(two-tailed p-value of 
asymptotic t-statistic) 
Constant -2.263 (0.000) -2.458 (0.000) 
Size     
Log Total Sales  -0.804 (0.000) -1.020 (0.000) 
Profitability     
Return on Shareholders’ Capital      
Return on Capital employed      
Operating Profit  Margin      
Pre-tax Profit Margin      
Turnover      
Turnover/Net Current Assets  0.225 (0.017)   
Creditors Turnover     
Gearing      
Capital Gearing  0.828 (0.000)   
Income Gearing  0.865 (0.023)   
Borrowing Ratio    0.937 (0.007) 
Gross Cash Flow/ Total Liabilities    -0.439 (0.005) 
Loan Capital/Equity and Reserves    -1.312 (0.002) 
     
Liquidity     
Working Capital Ratio    -0.701 (0.001) 
Working Capital / Assets Employed     
Other Financial Variables     
Payout Ratio      
Assets Index    0.368 (0.007) 
Tax Ratio    -0.796 (0.050) 
Log-Likelihood at Convergence -134.65 -125.02 
χ2 statistic of LR Test (p-value) 49.39 (0.000) 68.64 (0.000) 
Likelihood Ratio Index 0.122 0.185 
n 421 
Per cent Failed  12.6 
  
consistent with the negative coefficients on the ratio of gross cash flow to total liabilities and on the 
working capital ratio. The four years prior to failure model suggests the importance of changes in the value 
of net tangible assets indicating that failing firms had a period of asset growth, which might have facilitated 
their access to credit, providing that borrowing restrictions were based on book value of equity. In the 
model for the four-year risk horizon, the tax ratio has a negative sign, indicating that the proportion of tax 
payments in pre-tax profits is lower for failing firms. However, tax charges are subject to factors 
unconnected with the current year performance. Notably, no patterns with respect to company profitability 
are evident in the financial ratio-based models for two, three and four years prior to failure. 
 
As far as the classification and predictive ability of obtained accounting ratio-based models is concerned, 
the question of interest is to find to what extent the results are coherent. Models predicting short-term risk - 
within one and two years before failure (Table A-6) - generate relatively robust, with respect to a wide 
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range of cut-off probability values, estimates of the overall error rate adjusted for the optimism. Prediction 
error estimates vary from 14 percent to 26.1 percent for year one prior (Panel A in Table A-6), and for two 
years prior to failure they lie between 16.7 percent and 32 percent (Panel B in Table A-6). Roughly similar 
accuracy is demonstrated in validation. The performance of the four years prior to failure model, in terms 
of overall prediction error magnitudes and the robustness on both estimation and holdout observations, is 
remarkably similar to the accuracy levels observed for the one year prior to failure model and two years 
prior model. If accuracy is judged by the adjusted apparent error rate, the model for the three-year risk 
horizon is likely to forecast no worse than models for other risk horizons. The estimates of prediction error 
lie between 17.7 and 36.5 percent (Panel A in Table A-7), although the approximation of holdout 
observations is rather weak.  
 
 Models Incorporating Macroeconomic Variables 
 
Results from modelling the impact of macroeconomic instability are displayed in Tables 3 and 4. A series 
of risk-horizon-specific models incorporates financial variables alongside one-year lagged, unanticipated 
changes in the real effective exchange rate and in the nominal interest rate. The initial specification used to 
test down to more parsimonious models, is more complete than that used for the series of basic models. We 
allow for a lagged relation between the changes in a macroeconomic variable and the full economic impact 
of the changes on the firm’s performance as reflected in its financial accounts. As noted earlier in Section 
3.2, effects of macroeconomic instability on failure risk are modelled by using an interactive dummy, 
which is set to unity for observations on failing firms. That is we argue that non-failed firms had forecast 
more accurately the future conditions and were able to better and at lower costs react to ‘surprises’ in the 
macroeconomic environment. Hence, in modelling we assume that a failing company’s performance is 
sensitive to one-year lagged unanticipated changes because of miss-predictions by the failing firm or its 
inability to assess the impact of changes in the future business conditions and take correcting actions. We 
infer the models’ stability and relevance of aggregate economy risks by examining the significance of 
estimates of the individual coefficients for the interaction terms along with the accuracy of conditional 
predictions on primary and holdout data points. In holdout tests, outside the estimation period, we assume 
that all firms are at risk of failure and set the macroeconomic dummy to unity for both failing and non-
failed firms.  
 
Results presented in Tables 3 and 4 indicate that the impact of macroeconomic instability is substantial. 
The overall fit improves markedly. All models, across the four risk horizons, show acceptable overall 
performance with the Likelihood Ratio 2χ  statistics being significant at the 0.1% level. When judged by 
the Likelihood Ratio Index, the models augmented with the macroeconomic variables explain the failure 
outcome better than the basic, financial ratio-based models. Clearly, for the sample firms, failure risk is 
linked to unanticipated shifts in the real effective exchange rate. The coefficient for the unanticipated 
change in the real exchange rate is significant at the 1% level and better, across all four years preceding 
failure, being positively signed in the models for years one, two, and three prior to failure, but being 
negative in the model for four years prior. Overall, this indicates that increases in the real effective 
exchange rate precipitated company failure during the 1990s recession. These increases might have 
generated additional risks for exporters as compared with the generality of firms. Unexpected increases in  
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Table 3:  Logit Models Incorporating Macroeconomic Variables:16 
  One and Two Years Prior to Failure; 1988-91 Estimation Period, 
  53 Failed Companies and 368 Non-failed Company-years (n=421) 
  
 
 
  One Year Prior to 
Failure 
Two Years Prior to Failure 
Dimension 
Variable 
Coefficient 
(two-tailed p-value of 
asymptotic t-statistic) 
Coefficient 
(two-tailed p-value of 
asymptotic t-statistic) 
Constant -5.481 (0.000) -2.682 (0.000) 
Size     
Log Total Sales    -0.540 (0.010) 
Profitability     
Return on Shareholders’ Capital  3.895 (0.000)   
Return on Capital employed  -3.778 (0.000)   
Operating Profit  Margin      
Pre-tax Profit Margin      
Turnover      
Turnover/Net Current Assets      
Creditors Turnover      
Gearing      
Capital Gearing  1.641 (0.000)   
Income Gearing      
Borrowing Ratio    0.548 (0.030) 
Gross Cash Flow/ Total Liabilities    -0.727 (0.001) 
Loan Capital/Equity and Reserves     
Liquidity     
Working Capital Ratio    -0.980 (0.002) 
Working Capital / Assets Employed -1.222 (0.018)   
Other Financial Variables     
Payout Ratio      
Assets Index      
Tax Ratio      
Macroeconomic Variables      
Change in Real Effective Exchange Rate  190.452 (0.002) 35.066 (0.000) 
Change in Nominal Interest Rate  31.230 (0.000)   
Log-Likelihood at Convergence -25.90 -115.69 
χ2 statistic of LR Test (p-value) 266.90 (0.000) 87.31 (0.000) 
Likelihood Ratio Index 0.831 0.246 
n 421 
Per cent Failed  12.6 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
16  Macroeconomic variables enter the model specification as interaction terms, where the binary indicator takes on 
‘one’ for observations on failing firms. 
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Table 4:  Logit Models Incorporating Macroeconomic Variables:17  
  Three and Four Years Prior to Failure; 1988-91 Estimation Period,  
  53 Failed Companies and 368 Non-failed Company-years (n=421) 
  
 
 
  Three Years Prior to 
Failure 
Four Years Prior to 
Failure 
Dimension 
Variable 
Coefficient 
(two-tailed p-value of 
asymptotic t-statistic) 
Coefficient 
(two-tailed p-value of 
asymptotic t-statistic) 
Constant -2.519 (0.000) -3.243 (0.000) 
Size     
Log Total Sales  -0.651 (0.001) -0.621 (0.028) 
Profitability     
Return on Shareholders’ Capital      
Return on Capital employed      
Operating Profit  Margin    1.441 (0.045) 
Pre-tax Profit Margin    -1.683 (0.034) 
Turnover      
Turnover/Net Current Assets      
Creditors Turnover      
Gearing      
Capital Gearing  0.867 (0.000)   
Income Gearing  0.751 (0.043)   
Borrowing Ratio    1.126 (0.025) 
Gross Cash Flow/ Total Liabilities      
Loan Capital/Equity and Reserves   -1.374 (0.021) 
Liquidity     
Working Capital Ratio    -0.699 (0.036) 
Working Capital / Assets Employed     
Other Financial Variables     
Payout Ratio      
Assets Index      
Tax Ratio    -1.478 (0.009) 
Macroeconomic Variables     
Change in Real Effective Exchange Rate  32.773 (0.000) -122.365 (0.000) 
Change in Nominal Interest Rate  -26.655 (0.000) 21.104 (0.000) 
Log-Likelihood at Convergence -118.31 -81.04 
χ2 statistic of LR Test (p-value) 82.08 (0.000) 156.63 (0.000) 
Likelihood Ratio Index 0.228 0.472 
n 421 
Per cent Failed  12.6 
 
                                                          
17   Macroeconomic variables enter the model specification as interaction terms, where the binary indicator takes on 
‘one’ for observations on failing firms. 
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Table 5:  Probit Models Incorporating Macroeconomic Variables:18  
  One and two Years Prior to Failure; 1988-91 Estimation Period,  
  53 Failed Companies and 368 Non-failed Company-years (n=421) 
  
 
 
  One Year Prior to 
Failure 
Two Years Prior to Failure 
Dimension 
Variable 
Coefficient 
(two-tailed p-value of 
asymptotic t-statistic) 
Coefficient 
(two-tailed p-value of 
asymptotic t-statistic) 
Constant -2.798 (0.000) -1.510 (0.000) 
Size     
Log Total Sales    -0.295 (0.003) 
Profitability     
Return on Shareholders’ Capital  1.941 (0.000)   
Return on Capital employed  -1.944 (0.000)   
Operating Profit  Margin      
Pre-tax Profit Margin      
Turnover      
Turnover/Net Current Assets      
Creditors Turnover      
Gearing      
Capital Gearing  0.856 (0.000)   
Income Gearing      
Borrowing Ratio    0.301 (0.050) 
Gross Cash Flow/ Total Liabilities    -0.413 (0.001) 
Loan Capital/Equity and Reserves     
Liquidity     
Working Capital Ratio    -0.569 (0.000) 
Working Capital / Assets Employed -0.621 (0.000)   
Other Financial Variables     
Payout Ratio      
Assets Index      
Tax Ratio      
Macroeconomic Variables     
Change in Real Effective Exchange Rate  97.275 (0.000) 15.823 (0.005) 
Change in Nominal Interest Rate  15.172 (0.000)   
Log-Likelihood at Convergence -26.705 -116.45 
χ2 statistic of LR Test (p-value)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
n 421 
Per cent Failed  12.6 
 
                                                          
18   Macroeconomic variables enter the model specification as interaction terms, where the binary indicator takes on 
‘one’ for observations on failing firms. 
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Table 6:  Cox Proportional Hazards Models Incorporating Macroeconomic Variables:19  
  One and Two Years Prior to Failure; 1988-91 Estimation Period,  
  53 Failed Companies and 368 Non-failed Company-years (n=421) 
  
 
 
  One Year Prior to 
Failure 
Two Years Prior to Failure 
Dimension 
Variable 
Coefficient 
(two-tailed p-value of 
asymptotic t-statistic) 
Coefficient 
(two-tailed p-value of 
asymptotic t-statistic) 
Size     
Log Total Sales    -0.409 (0.004) 
Profitability     
Return on Shareholders’ Capital  -0.037 (0.297)   
Return on Capital employed  -.0142 (0.132)   
Operating Profit  Margin      
Pre-tax Profit Margin      
Turnover      
Turnover/Net Current Assets      
Creditors Turnover      
Gearing      
Capital Gearing  0.258 (0.000)   
Income Gearing      
Borrowing Ratio    0.230 (0.000) 
Gross Cash Flow/ Total Liabilities    -0.455 (0.002) 
Loan Capital/Equity and Reserves     
Liquidity     
Working Capital Ratio    -0.714 (0.000) 
Working Capital / Assets Employed -0.0325 0.122   
Other Financial Variables     
Payout Ratio      
Assets Index      
Tax Ratio      
Macroeconomic Variables     
Change in Real Effective Exchange Rate  67.892 (0.122) 22.547 (0.001) 
Change in Nominal Interest Rate  15.842 (0.000)   
Log-Likelihood at Convergence -214.865 -281.988 
χ2 statistic of LR Test (p-value)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
n 421 
Per cent Failed  12.6 
 
the exchange rate can cause a decline in liquidity due to falling revenues and, over a longer period of time, 
may inflict a loss of competitiveness. In addition, increases in the exchange rate can have possible 
detrimental effects on performance measures, especially on the earnings per share, in relation to reported 
overseas profits. Firms with located overseas and denominated in foreign currency assets may experience 
deteriorating solvency and face financing constraints when the pound appreciates. However, our findings 
on the relation between the exchange rate changes and failure risk, contrast somewhat with the conclusions 
drawn by Bhattacharjee, Higson, Holly, Kattuman (2002) and by Vlieghe (2001).   
 
Further, our results show that unexpected movements in the nominal interest rate are an important 
determinant of failure for the firms in our sample. In the model for three years prior to failure (Table 4), the 
                                                          
19   Macroeconomic variables enter the model specification as interaction terms, where the binary indicator takes on 
‘one’ for observations on failing firms. 
 19
coefficient for the nominal interest rate effects is negative. However, results from the models for one-year 
and four-year risk horizons (Tables 3 and 4) lend support to the stylised fact that unexpected increases in 
the nominal interest rate exacerbate financial constraints on highly geared firms. Such unexpected increases 
may apply with particular force to the companies in our sample, which pertain to the early 1990s. A report 
by The Bank of England suggested that in the early 1990s, subdued equity issues and a fall in short-term 
interest rates following the stock market crash of October 1987, encouraged companies to issue long-term 
debt and increase short-term borrowing. The capital gearing of UK industrial and commercial companies 
rose significantly over the early 1990s being about three times higher than in 1980s (Bank of England 
Quarterly Bulletin, August 1993). A sharp rise in interest rates from 1988 increased companies’ debt 
service costs while the subsequent recession lowered companies’ ability to service debt.  
 
The inclusion of the two macroeconomic indicators illustrates the robustness of the estimates of the effects 
of liquidity and gearing. Similarly to the results from financial ratio-based models, size is a significant 
explanatory factor at risk horizons of two to four years. Profitability measures are now important both in 
the short run and in the long run, with rates of return and profit margins explaining failure at one and four 
years prior to failure. The rate of return on shareholders’ capital retains its positive sign and the rate of 
return on capital employed is negatively signed. In the four years prior to failure model (Table 4), 
coefficients on profitability measures indicate that despite failing firms achieving relatively higher 
operating profit margins, their pre-tax profit margins are smaller than those of non-failed firms, suggesting 
perhaps the absence of signs of economic distress. At all risk horizons, models augmented with 
macroeconomic indicators seem to reiterate the stylised fact that high gearing increases failure risk. 
Precipitating failure, relatively lower liquidity ratios are important in years one, two and four before failure. 
 
To illustrate robustness of the results to the choice of the underlying distribution in modelling a binary 
outcome of company failure we have obtained a set of probit estimates for the final specifications that 
account for the effects of the real exchange rate and the nominal interest rate (Table 5). We use the same 
sets of predictors as in the parsimonious logit specifications of Table4 and find that isolated determinants 
retain their signs and significance with strong positive effects of the two macroeconomic variables of 
interest. We notice that the change of the underlying distribution makes no difference to any conclusions 
about the influential predictors.  
 
We then consider the issue of potential distortion caused by the failure of logit and probit to utilise 
information about the timing of changes of state and associated duration in the event such as company 
insolvency/failure. To investigate the robustness of our results to the additional influence of duration times 
we estimate with the same set of covariates Cox proportional hazards models where the shape of the hazard 
function is essentially left unspecified (Table 6). The survival duration is defined by age at entry into the 
state of insolvency. However, at this juncture we have to mention a major measurement problem that 
occurs in defining and ascertaining the ‘unique’ timings of company ‘birth’. Information on dates of 
formation of businesses, required to proxy the timing of birth, was unavailable, therefore, we made a strong 
assumption that observation commences at the time DATASTREAM begins records on a particular 
company. In considering the findings from the Cox hazards model we bear in mind this drawback. On the 
whole, it appears that the survival model estimates, too, lend support to the strong significance of the two 
macroeconomic factors in the company failure process. In the Cox model for year two prior to failure, the 
signs and significance of all the covariates are similar to the original logit analysis. On balance, one might 
say that the Cox results provide tentative evidence that the model of company failure for the two-year 
horizon is more robust.  
  
An additional explanatory power of the added macroeconomic indicators is inferred by assessing models 
performance in predicting failure.  
 
Classificatory accuracy, evaluated by applying the one year prior to failure model to the data points used in 
fitting the model (Panel A in Table A-8), indicates that the conditioning on the effects of the 
macroeconomic variables improves correct classification rates both for failed and for non-failed firms as 
compared to the basic financial ratio-based model constructed for the same risk horizon (Panel A in Table 
A-6). This improvement observed across all cut-off probability values is consistent with a decrease in the 
overall prediction error adjusted for the downward bias. Predictions of the holdout data points, at this risk 
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horizon, are also characterized by lower overall error rates, ranging from 9.4 per cent to 10.4 per cent 
(Panel A in Table A-8). 
  
Predictive power of the model explaining the risk of failure at the risk horizon of two years (Panel B in 
Table A-8) is somewhat weaker than that of the one year prior to failure model. First, we should point out 
the deterioration in the holdout approximation at the cut-off values of 0.1 and 0.125, as compared to the 
financial ratio-based model performance (Panel B in Table A-6). When the cut-off probability values of 0.1 
and 0.125 are used for evaluation, the overall accuracy declines to the levels of 36.5 to 42.7 per cent, being 
lower than a correct prediction rate of 61.5 per cent and better, which is achieved by the basic financial 
ratio-based model constructed for this risk horizon. 
 
Using fresh holdout data drawn from 1997-2005 we provide a further validation of our argument about the 
key role of the two macroeconomic factors in the process of company failure. Table A-8 gives the results 
from a check of forecasts’ accuracy at a longer horizon, for the one and two years prior to failure logit 
specifications described in Tables 3 and 4. Judged by the accuracy of classifying fresh data points of an 
equal-share holdout the overall predictive performance is still around 40% for the model one year prior to 
failure. This improves to 70% for a cut-off of 0.5 when the predictions are based on the model two years 
prior to failure. The latter result is particularly surprising given the extent to which the two periods differ in 
terms of financial reporting standards and economic and financial circumstances. 
  
The importance of the macroeconomic factors for explaining failure risk in the long run, is supported by 
definite improvements in classificatory and predictive ability of models developed for three and four years 
prior to failure (Table A-9). In comparison to basic models with financial ratios alone, the three years prior 
and four years prior to failure models, augmented with the macroeconomic indicators, demonstrate 
improved accuracy in categorizing observations from both the estimation sample and the holdout sample 
across all cut-off probability values. Notably, accuracy gains provided by the four years prior model are 
consistent with the adjusted for the downward bias alternative estimates of prediction error of 15.2 per cent 
and better. The predictive quality is supported by the accuracy assessed on holdout observations where the 
overall error rate of 21.9 per cent and better is observed. 
 
4 Conclusions 
 
The objective of this paper was to re-examine the determinants of company failure by looking directly at 
the contribution of the environmental, macroeconomic factors to the likelihood of failure measured at the 
firm level in a sample of UK large quoted industrials taken from the early 1990s. Macroeconomic 
indicators were incorporated into conventional cross-sectional models of failure risk. Lagged yearly, 
unanticipated changes in the nominal interest rate and in the real effective exchange rate are significant 
variables in explaining failure. We assessed both short-term and long-term effects of the shifts in the two 
macroeconomic indicators on the probability of insolvency by fitting logit models pooled across several 
years’ cross-section data, at risk horizons ranging from one to four years before failure. We assessed model 
adequacy and inferred the importance of the macroeconomic factors from the significance of coefficient 
estimates and classificatory and predictive accuracy of the models.  
 
The pattern of significance of financial statement-based determinants assessed for the four-year period prior 
to failure, provided evidence on the key role of gearing, liquidity and profitability, corroborating earlier 
results on UK company failure (Taffler, 1982; Keasey and McGuinness, 1990; Alici, 1995), and was robust 
to the model augmentation with macroeconomic indicators.  
 
Models incorporating the macroeconomic indicators exhibited lower prediction errors assessed on an out-
of-sample basis. The best predicting models, augmented with the two macroeconomic variables, 
demonstrated stability and the adequate fit on the out-of-sample data points. In holdout tests, the overall 
accuracy of 90.6 per cent and better was achieved at the one-year risk horizon and of 71.9 per cent and 
better at the risk horizons of three and four years. The achieved accuracy compares favourably with a 
weaker approximation of the holdout observations by the basic models based on financial ratios alone. 
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The empirical relation between the probability of failure and unanticipated changes in the real exchange 
rate and nominal interest rate appeared stable over the four-year period before failure. Obtained empirical 
predictors suggested that during the 1990s recession, unanticipated increases in the real exchange rate and 
rises in the nominal interest rate were associated with a higher propensity of UK quoted industrial company 
to fail, thus indicating the links to declining liquidity, to a loss in competitiveness, and to the detriment of 
inflation for highly geared firms.  
APPENDIX: EFRON’S FORMULA 
The estimate of the true error rate is calculated by adding a bias correction to the apparent error rate. The 
expected excess error rate is obtained using the analytic result from Efron (1986): 
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Appendix: Data Set Description and Model Performance Results 
  
Table A-1: Names and Years of Entering Insolvency Regime, 
of UK Failed Quoted Industrials Used in the Estimation Sample  
 
Allied Partnership Group 1992 Ketson 1990 
Arley Holdings 1990 Lawtex 1991 
Arnkliffe Holdings 1991 Lilley  1993 
Astra Holdings 1992 Lyon & Lyon 1990 
AT Trust 1990 Maxwell Comms. Corporation 1991 
ATP Communications Group 1992 Miller (Stanley) Holdings 1990 
Audit & General  1991 Oakwood Group 1990 
Bestwood 1990 Parkfield Group 1990 
C.H. Industrials 1991 Pavilion Leisure 1991 
Chelsea Man 1991 Pavion International 1989 
Chequers Group 1992 Peters (Michael) Group 1990 
Clearmark Group 1991 Polly Peck International 1990 
Colographic 1992 Reliant Group 1990 
Coloroll 1990 Rockwood Holdings 1990 
Conder Group 1992 Rush & Tomkins Group 1990 
Crown Communications Group 1993 Sale Tilney  1992 
Doctus 1991 Toothill (R.W.) 1991 
Ferrari Holdings 1991 Trilion 1992 
Fobel International 1991 Turriff Corporation 1991 
Futura Holdings 1993 Video Store Group 1991 
Gaynor Group 1991 Ward Group 1992 
Goldberg (A.) & Sons 1990 West Industries 1992 
Grovewood Securities 1991 Westerly 1991 
Halls Homes & Gardens 1992 Willaire Group 1992 
Hey & Croft Group 1992 Williams (John) Industries 1990 
Huges Food Group 1991 Yellowhammer 1990 
International Resort Holdings 1992   
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Table A-2: Names and Years of Entering Insolvency Regime 
of UK Failed Quoted Industrials Used in the Holdout Samples 
 
1st Holdout Sample 
    
Automagic Holdings 1995 Ferranti International 1993 
Beckenham Group 1994 Harland Simon Group 1992 
Bimec Industries 1994 McLaughlin & Harvey  1993 
Bullers  1995 Pentos 1995 
Dunkeld 1993 Scottish Heritable Trust 1994 
    
2nd Holdout Sample  
    
Mayflower Corporation  2003 European Telecom         2003 
Airflow Streamlines     2004 Baldwin                2003 
ASW Holdings            2002 United Overseas Group 2002 
Photobition             2001 Albert Fisher            2002 
Cammell Laird Holdings  2001 Energis                  2002 
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Table A-3: Composition of the UK Company Cross-sections for the Reporting Years 1988-94,  
Breakdown of Observational Units by Insolvency Status and Economic Groups (Percentages in parentheses) 
 
  
 FT-SE  Economic Groups 
 
 
Mineral 
Extraction 
General 
Industrials 
Consumer Goods  
Services 
 
Utilities 
 
Total 
Panel A: Estimation Sample, 1988-91 
Non-Failed 1 (0.3) 173 (54.7) 35 (11.1) 106 (33.5) 1 (0.3) 31620 (100) 
Failed - - 24 (45.3) 5 (9.4) 24 (45.3) - - 53 (100) 
Panel B: Holdout Samples  
Holdout sample from 1992-94            
Non-Failed 2 (2.3) 40 (46.5) 15 (17.4) 29 (33.7) - - 86 (100) 
Failed - - 7 (70.0) 1 (10.0) 2 (20.0) - - 10 (100) 
            
Holdout sample from 1997-2005            
Non-Failed - - 4 (40.0) 1 (10.0) 5 (50.0) - - 10 (100) 
Failed - - 4 (40.0) 2 (20.0) 4 (40.0) - - 10 (100) 
            
            
            
 
                                                          
20 The figure excludes double-counting as the group of non-failed firms consists of data on 368 company-years represented by 316 live companies, on which the accounts data on 
four consecutive years were available. 
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Table A-4: Means and t-statistics – Financial Ratio-based Variables and Cases Used in the Estimation Samples for One and Two Years Prior to Failure 
Sample Period 1988-91, 53 Failed Companies and 368 Non-failed Company-Years  
 
   
 One Year Prior Two Years Prior 
 Mean (n=421) Mean (n=421) 
Financial Dimension (Normalised Values) (Normalised Values) 
Accounting Variable21  Failed Non-failed t-value Failed Non-failed t-value 
Size       
Log of Total Sales (Net of Trade Discounts) -0.330 0.094 3.70*** -0.451 0.077 4.18*** 
Profitability       
Return on Shareholders’ Capital 0.200 -0.002 1.05 -0.414 0.043 2.65*** 
Return on Capital Employed  -0.526 0.069 4.61*** -0.367 0.026 2.94*** 
Return on Net Fixed Assets -0.442 0.046 3.97*** -0.398 0.002 2.83*** 
Cumulative Profitability22  0.227 -0.005 1.06 -0.237 0.026 1.73* 
Operating Profit Margin  -0.334 0.063 4.11*** -0.564 0.048 4.81*** 
Pre-tax Profit Margin  -0.443 0.078 5.07*** -0.724 0.067 5.03*** 
Net Profit Margin  -0.407 0.099 4.32*** -0.705 0.072 4.46*** 
Turnover       
Turnover / Fixed Assets  -0.090 -0.016 0.52 -0.069 -0.022 0.35 
Turnover / Net Current Assets  -0.258 -0.050 2.54** -0.018 -0.022 0.05 
Stock Turnover  -0.036 -0.041 0.04 -0.103 0.050 2.16** 
Debtors Turnover  -0.148 0.017 1.08 -0.075 0.010 1.10 
Creditors Turnover  -0.362 0.090 3.04*** -0.320 0.059 2.73*** 
       
***   Significant at 0.01. 
**      Significant at 0.05. 
*        Significant at 0.10. 
                                                          
21 See ratio definitions in the Company Accounts Definitions Manual published by DATASTREAM, Issue 5, May 1994.  
22 The cumulative profitability ratio is a variant of the measure employed in Altman, Haldeman and Narayanan (1977) and is has been calculated by dividing revenue reserves by 
total assets employed.  
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Table A-4: - Continued  
 
       
 One Year Prior Two Years Prior 
 Mean (n=421) Mean (n=421) 
Financial Dimension (Normalised Values) (Normalised Values) 
Accounting Variable  Failed Non-failed t-value Failed Non-failed t-value 
Gearing       
Capital Gearing  0.662 -0.035 5.49*** 0.147 -0.14 0.61 
Income Gearing  0.459 -0.046 1.97* 0.073 0.005 0.63 
Borrowing Ratio -0.125 -0.009 0.34 0.464 0.020 2.15** 
Gross Cash-flow / Total Liabilities  -0.734 0.089 5.61*** -0.760 0.072 6.66*** 
Loan Capital / Equity and Reserves 0.267 0.008 0.93 0.320 0.026 1.71* 
Liquidity       
Working Capital Ratio -0.640 0.069 9.44*** -0.428 0.040 5.20*** 
Quick Assets Ratio  -0.552 0.048 4.25*** -0.346 0.024 2.88*** 
Working Capital / Assets Employed23  -0.180 0.021 -0.47 -0.184 0.038 2.27* 
Other       
Market Value/Book Value -0.385 -0.028 2.76*** -0.061 -0.010 0.47 
Payout Ratio  -0.300 0.023 2.71*** -0.284 0.078 2.07* 
Assets Index  0.125 0.031 0.47 0.125 0.017 0.35 
Tax Ratio  -0.200 0.100 1.54 -0.640 0.044 2.36* 
       
 
 
***   Significant at 0.01. 
**      Significant at 0.05. 
*        Significant at 0.10. 
 
                                                          
23 A similar ratio was used in Altman (1968). 
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Table A-5: Means and t-statistics – Financial Ratio-based Variables and Cases Used in the Estimation Samples for Three and Four Years Prior to Failure 
  Sample Period 1988-91, 53 Failed Companies and 368 Non-failed Company-Years  
 
 
   
 Three Years Prior Four Years Prior 
 Mean (n=421) Mean (n=421) 
Financial Dimension (Normalised Values) (Normalised Values) 
Accounting Variable  Failed Non-failed t-value Failed Non-failed t-value 
Size       
Log of Total Sales (Net of Trade Discounts) -0.490 0.062 4.56*** -0.577 0.033 5.17*** 
Profitability       
Return on Shareholders’ Capital  -0.231 0.076 1.68* -0.235 0.040 2.38** 
Return on Capital Employed  -0.179 0.028 1.41 -0.279 0.086 2.41** 
Return on Net Fixed Assets -0.133 0.044 1.40 -0.396 0.085 2.79*** 
Cumulative Profitability  -0.058 0.033 0.46 0.139 -0.026 0.62 
Operating Profit Margin  -0.305 0.056 2.82*** -0.249 0.070 2.13** 
Pre-Tax Profit Margin  -0.401 0.085 3.77*** -0.394 0.082 3.24*** 
Net Profit Margin  -0.345 0.077 3.35*** -0.304 0.043 2.61*** 
Turnover       
Turnover / Fixed Assets  0.089 -0.013 0.73 0.096 0.027 0.45 
Turnover / Net Current Assets  0.346 0.007 1.90* 0.029 -0.003 0.20 
Stock Turnover  0.333 -0.034 1.43 -0.012 0.057 0.39 
Debtors Turnover  0.018 0.037 0.11 -0.081 0.053 0.85 
Creditors Turnover  -0.103 0.022 0.61 -0.086 0.020 0.69 
       
 
***   Significant at 0.01. 
**      Significant at 0.05. 
*        Significant at 0.10. 
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Table A-5: - Continued  
 
       
 Three Years Prior Four Years Prior 
 Mean (n=421) Mean (n=421) 
Financial Dimension (Normalised Values) (Normalised Values) 
Accounting Variable  Failed Non-failed t-value Failed Non-failed t-value 
Gearing       
Capital Gearing  0.483 -0.089 3.19*** 0.576 -0.096 3.16*** 
Income Gearing  0.195 -0.038 2.13** 0.074 -0.017 0.60 
Borrowing Ratio  -0.031 -0.043 0.11 -0.123 -0.033 0.40 
Gross Cash-Flow / Total Liabilities -0.429 0.069 3.46*** -0.520 0.128 4.30*** 
Loan Capital / Equity and Reserves  -0.170 -0.055 0.45 -0.195 0.010 1.61 
Liquidity       
Working Capital Ratio  -0.279 0.060 2.88** -0.314 0.104 2.36** 
Quick Assets Ratio  -0.197 0.036 1.70* -0.229 0.103 1.84 
Working Capital / Assets Employed  -0.221 0.013 1.29 -0.086 0.028 0.44 
Other       
Market Value/Book Value  0.297 0.003 0.97 -0.271 -0.036 1.16 
Payout Ratio  -0.064 0.012 0.34 -0.286 0.029 2.17** 
Assets Index  0.148 -0.027 0.59 0.077 -0.039 0.47 
Tax Ratio  -0.231 -0.023 2.35** -0.294 0.081 1.89* 
       
 
 
***   Significant at 0.01. 
**      Significant at 0.05. 
*        Significant at 0.10. 
 
 
  28
 
Table A-6: Classification and Predictive Ability of Financial Ratio-Based Models,   
  One and Two Years Prior to Failure:  
 
  1988-91 Estimation Period  
  (53 Failed Companies and 368 Non-failed Company-years); 
  1992-94 Holdout Period24 
  (10 Failed and 86 Non-failed Companies). 
 
 
Panel A: One Year Prior to Failure: Correct Classification, Percentage 
Cut-off Value 0.1 0.125 0.25 0.5 0.75 0.875 
Estimation Sample       
Non-failed 73.6 79.1 92.7 97.8 99.2 99.5 
Failed 90.6 79.2 54.7 45.3 18.9 9.4 
Overall 75.8 79.1 87.9 91.2 89.1 88.1 
Overall Error Rate Bias Estimated by 
Efron’s Formula 
1.9 2.4 3.9 5.2 6.2 6.5 
Estimate of Prediction Error 26.1 23.3 16.0 14.0 17.1 18.4 
       
1st Holdout Sample from1992-94:       
Non-failed 73.3 77.9 90.7 96.5 96.5 96.5 
Failed 100.0 100.0 60.0 40.0 30.0 30.0 
Overall 76.1 80.2 87.5 90.6 89.6 89.6 
      
Panel B: Two Years Prior to Failure: Correct Classification, Percentage 
Cut-off Value 0.1 0.125 0.25 0.5 0.75 0.875 
Estimation Sample       
Non-failed 67.7 75.8 93.2 98.4 99.2 99.7 
Failed 86.8 77.4 45.3 18.9 7.5 3.8 
Overall 70.1 76 87.2 88.4 87.6 87.6 
Overall Error Rate Bias Estimated by 
Efron’s Formula 
2.1 2.6 4.1 5.1 5.5 5.7 
Estimate of Prediction Error 32.0 26.6 16.9 16.7 17.9 18.1 
       
1st Holdout Sample from1992-94:       
Non-failed 59.3 65.1 88.4 96.5 98.8 100 
Failed 80.0 70.0 50.0 20.0 10.0 0.0 
Overall 61.5 65.6 84.4 88.5 89.6 89.6 
       
                                                          
24 The holdout period is defined in terms of year of last accounts.  
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Table A-7: Classification and Predictive Ability of Financial Ratio-Based Models, 
  Three and Four Years Prior to Failure:  
 
  1988-91 Estimation Period  
  (53 Failed Companies and 368 Non-failed Company-years); 
  1992-94 Holdout Period 
  (10 Failed and 86 Non-failed Companies). 
 
 
 
Panel A: Three Years Prior to Failure: Correct Classification, Percentage 
Cut-off Value 0.1 0.125 0.25 0.5 0.75 0.875 
Estimation Sample       
Non-failed 62.8 75.5 92.4 98.4 99.7 99.7 
Failed 83.0 73.6 34 9.4 3.8 3.8 
Overall 65.3 75.3 85 87.2 87.6 87.6 
Overall Error Rate Bias Estimated by 
Efron’s Formula   
1.8 2.3 3.8 5 5.3 5.4 
Estimate of Prediction Error 36.5 27.0 18.8 17.8 17.7 17.8 
       
1st Holdout Sample from1992-94:       
Non-failed 27.9 29.1 34.9 38.4 40.7 40.7 
Failed 50.0 40.0 30.0 30.0 30.0 30.0 
Overall 30.2 30.2 34.4 37.5 39.6 39.6 
       
Panel B: Four Years Prior to Failure: Correct Classification, Percentage 
Cut-off Value 0.1 0.125 0.25 0.5 0.75 0.875 
Estimation Sample       
Non-failed 67.9 75.3 90.2 98.6 100 100 
Failed 77.4 69.8 39.6 24.5 9.4 1.9 
Overall 69.1 74.6 83.8 89.3 88.6 87.6 
Overall Error Rate Bias Estimated by 
Efron’s Formula   
2.1 2.6 4.2 5.6 6.3 6.5 
Estimate of Prediction Error 33.0 28.0 20.4 16.3 17.7 18.9 
       
1st Holdout Sample from1992-94:       
Non-failed 60.5 65.1 83.7 94.2 95.3 95.3 
Failed 80.0 80.0 50.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Overall 62.5 66.7 80.2 84.4 85.4 85.4 
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Table A-8 Classification and Predictive Ability of Models 
  Incorporating Macroeconomic Variables: 
  
  One and Two Years Prior to Failure,  
  Classifications and Predictions Conditioned on Interactive Effects 
between Macroeconomic Variables and Failure. 
  1988-91 Estimation Period (53 Failed Companies and 368 Non-failed Company-years); 
   
1992-94 Holdout Period25 (10 Failed and 86 Non-failed Companies); 
1997-2005 Holdout Period (10 Failed and 10 No-failed Companies). 
 
Panel A: One Year Prior to Failure: Correct Classification, Percentage 
Cut-off Value 0.1 0.125 0.25 0.5 0.75 0.875 
Estimation Sample:  
Non-failed 97.6 98.6 99.2 99.5 99.5 100 
Failed 94.3 94.3 92.5 90.6 84.9 83 
Overall 97.1 98.1 98.3 98.3 97.6 97.9 
Overall Error Rate Bias Estimated by 
Efron’s Formula   
1.1 1.2 1.4 1.7 2.1 2.3 
Estimate of Prediction Error 4.0 3.1 3.1 3.4 4.5 4.4 
       
1st Holdout Sample from1992-94:  
Non-failed 98.8 98.8 98.8 98.8 98.8 98.8 
Failed 20.0 20.0 20.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 
Overall 90.6 90.6 90.6 89.6 89.6 89.6 
       
2nd Holdout Sample from 1997-2005:       
Non-failed 60.0 60.0 60.0 60.0 60.0 60.0 
Failed 20.0 20.0 20.0 20.0 20.0 20.0 
Overall 40.0 40.0 40.0 40.0 40.0 40.0 
       
Panel B: Two Years Prior to Failure: Correct Classification, Percentage 
Cut-off Value 0.1 0.125 0.25 0.5 0.75 0.875 
Estimation Sample:  
Non-failed 73.1 79.9 95.4 98.6 99.2 99.7 
Failed 75.5 73.6 56.6 39.6 17.0 9.4 
Overall 73.4 79.1 90.5 91.2 88.8 88.4 
Overall Error Rate Bias Estimated by 
Efron’s Formula   
2.1 2.5 3.7 4.7 5.3 5.6 
Estimate of Prediction Error 28.7 23.4 13.2 13.5 16.5 17.2 
       
1st Holdout Sample from1992-94:  
Non-failed 29.1 38.4 68.6 93.0 97.7 98.8 
Failed 100.0 80.0 50.0 50.0 10.0 0.0 
Overall 36.5 42.7 66.7 88.5 88.5 88.5 
       
2nd Holdout Sample from 1997-2005:       
Non-failed 50.0 70.0 80.0 80.0 90.0 90.0 
Failed 70.0 70.0 70.0 60.0 20.0 20.0 
Overall 60.0 70.0 75.0 70.0 55.0 55.0 
       
 
                                                          
25 Holdout periods are defined in terms of year of last accounts.  
  31
Table A-9  Classification and Predictive Ability of Models 
  Incorporating Macroeconomic Variables: 
  
  Three and Four Years Prior to Failure,  
  Classifications and Predictions Conditioned on Interactive Effects 
between Macroeconomic Variables and Failure. 
   
  1988-91 Estimation Period;  
  (53 Failed Companies and 368 Non-failed Company-years), 
  1992-94 Holdout Period 
  (10 Failed and 86 Non-failed Companies) 
 
Panel A: Three Years Prior to Failure: Correct Classification, Percentage 
Cut-off Value 0.1 0.125 0.25 0.5 0.75 0.875 
Estimation Sample:  
Non-failed 78.2 84.5 96.5 99.2 99.5 100.0 
Failed 84.9 79.2 56.6 41.5 18.9 5.7 
Overall 79.1 83.8 91.4 91.9 89.3 88.1 
Overall Error Rate Bias Estimated by 
Efron’s Formula   
2.1 2.6 3.7 4.7 5.4 5.8 
Estimate of Prediction Error 23.0 18.8 12.3 12.8 16.1 17.7 
       
1st Holdout Sample from1992-94: 
Non-failed 38.4 38.4 39.5 43 43 45.3 
Failed 40.0 40 40 30 30 30 
Overall 38.5 38.5 39.6 41.7 41.7 43.8 
       
Panel B: Four Years Prior to Failure: Correct Classification, Percentage 
Cut-off Value 0.1 0.125 0.25 0.5 0.75 0.875 
Estimation Sample:  
Non-failed 87.8 92.7 96.2 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Failed 83.0 83.0 77.4 67.9 52.8 41.5 
Overall 87.2 91.4 93.8 96.0 94.1 92.6 
Overall Error Rate Bias Estimated by 
Efron’s Formula   
2.4 2.6 3.5 4.4 5.0 5.4 
Estimate of Prediction Error 15.2 11.2 9.7 8.4 10.9 12.8 
       
1st Holdout Sample from1992-94: 
Non-failed 80.2 80.2 81.4 81.4 83.7 83.7 
Failed 60.0 60.0 60.0 60.0 60.0 60.0 
Overall 78.1 78.1 79.2 79.2 81.3 81.3 
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